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Abstract
We use a panel of quarterly time series observations on Finnish banks to estimate reduced form equations for the growth rate of bank loans.
By allowing for individual bank specific effects in the empirical models we specifically seek evidence of a bank-lending channel for the
transmission of monetary policy shocks in Finland. On the basis of our estimation results, we conclude that there is weak evidence in favour
of the bank-lending channel for monetary policy shocks. Our data overlaps with the post crisis recovery of the Finnish banking sector with
specific government support measures still active during the good part of the sample period. We try to capture the effects of these measures
through a policy dummy variable in our empirical models. This policy dummy is highly significant, suggesting that the measures may have
contributed to the growth rate of bank loans during the sample period.
JEL classification code: E51, E52, G21
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1. Introduction
Research work on the transmission of monetary policy (shocks) to the economy is grow-
ing steadily. After a period of relatively intensive work, typically using structural vec-
torautoregressions (SVAR), on the transmission of exogenous monetary policy shocks at
the aggregate level,
1 research has more recently increasingly moved towards analysing
policy transmission at the micro level. Improved availability and quality of panel data sets,
perhaps with a healthy good number of time series observations incorporated in them, to-
gether with the progress that has taken place in developing statistical methods for panel
data, has resulted in an increase the efficiency of statistical inference. Also, use of panel
data has provided additional flexibility to model users when they specify their statistical
models for the purpose of inference, ie. estimation and hypothesis testing. More substan-
tially, making use of panels has the potential advantage of providing more detailed infor-
mation about how the distribution of liquidity changes after a monetary policy shock.
Many researchers accept the view that the actions of central banks have effects both on
inflation and output (gap). However, disagreement over the reasons still exists today.
2 The
traditional theories, exemplified in e.g. standard IS-LM models, focus on the direct effects
of interest rates or exchange rates on components of aggregate demand. This is the so
called money view of the transmission of monetary policy shocks.
3 Under this view, banks
are not special, and whatever the share of bank deposits in the relevant monetary aggre-
gate, their supply is taken to be a stable function of the monetary base, expressed in
money multipliers.
4
                                                
1 For a recent review on the aggregate effects of monetary policy shocks, see Christiano et al. (1998). The
authors argue that although the appropriate set of assumptions for identifying the effects of an exogenous
shock to monetary policy is still much debated in the literature, there seems to be considerable agreement
about the qualitative effects of a monetary policy shock.
2 Cecchetti (2001, p. 8).
3 See e.g. Trautwein (2000) for a recent survey on the different transmission channels for monetary policy
(shocks).
4 Trautwein (2000, p. 158), who also notes that there is an asymmetry in standard considerations of the macro-
economic importance of banks' balance sheets; deposit liabilities play a role in determining aggregate demand,
if only a subordinate one, by way of liquidity effects or real balance effects. Bank loans (assets) play no spe-
cific role, since other financial assets are regarded as perfect substitutes.ECB • Working Paper No 100 • December 2001 8
Banks are, however, special in the credit or lending view of monetary policy transmis-
sion
5. As for the policy effects, the credit view generally emphasises borrowers' balance
sheets as well as bank lending.
6 The effectiveness of monetary policy depends, under the
credit view, critically on capital market imperfections (informational problems) that make
it easier for some agents in the economy to obtain (outside) financing than others. Finan-
cial variables such as net worth or the amount of pre-existing debt accordingly influence
the costs of external funds and create a mechanism linking financial factors to real eco-
nomic activity.
7 Consequently, the effects of monetary policy shocks on individual bor-
rowers depend on the strength of their balance sheets.
8 An operative bank lending channel,
on the other hand, requires that a significant number of agents are dependent on banks for
finance and that monetary policy impulses take effect mainly through the supply of bank
loans.
9 Interest rate and capital regulations as well as banks' own balance sheet position
presumably underlie the bank lending channel.
10
In this paper, we try to bring in evidence that bears on the existence of the credit channel
of monetary policy in Finland. We approach the issue empirically by estimating reduced
form dynamic equations for bank loans,
 11 initially proposed by Kashyap and Stein (1995),
using a panel of Finnish banks over a relatively short period of time.
12 An important part
of our approach is the identification of monetary policy shocks. To this end the set of rele-
vant alternatives range from innovations in a relevant VAR through constructing surprises
to dated and documented monetary policy actions to simple differences in the relevant
policy instrument used by the central bank. By and large, we opt for the last one.
We want to make a couple of further observations that we think bear on our exercise, or
on any comparable exercise on the Finnish banking data from the late 1990's. First of all,
                                                
5 Cecchetti (2001, p. 8).
6 The list is not exhaustive here so that finer distinctions are possible, see e.g. Trautwein (2000).
7 See Repullo and Suarez (2000) and the references therein. The authors propose a model of the credit channel
of monetary policy based on entrepreneurial moral hazard and bank monitoring. See also Bolton and Freixas
(2000), whose model seeks to provide the underpinnings of the credit view of monetary policy.
8 Repullo and Suarez (2000, p. 1932).
9 See Kashyap and Stein (1997) for a summary of evidence that lend support to the importance of capital mar-
ket imperfections and firm dependence of bank financing.
10 Repullo and Suarez (2000, p. 1932).
11 Basically the dynamic equations are autoregressive - distributed lag models with exogenous control vari-
ables (ARDLX) for deposits and the identified monetary policy shock as well as bank loans and the identified
monetary policy shock, respectively.
12 The cross sections of our sample outnumber, by an order of magnitude, its time series dimension (appr.350
against 20). See Arellano and Honoré (2000) for a survey on recent developments in panel data models, where
one of the working hypotheses is ''large N small T''.ECB • Working Paper No 100 • December 2001  9
since our data is from the latter half of the 1990s, the first years spanned by it overlap with
the post-banking crisis period experienced by the Finnish economy after the fixed ex-
change rate regime collapsed late 1992. These years are characterised by banking sector
re-capitalisation,
13 greatly aided by public support from the government to banks to pre-
vent bankruptcy and the speeding up of the restructuring of the Finnish banking sector.
14
One potential implication here is that the credit supply behaviour of intermediaries may
have exacerbated the negative effects on spending caused by weak firm and household
balance sheets.
15
Secondly, although economic growth picked up already in late 1993 or early 1994, we
believe that the balance sheets of many firms and, in particular, of households continued
to deteriorate still for some time. Hence, the implied relatively low demand for (new)
loans may partly explain the slack in loan growth that we observe during the first half of
our sample. Also, evidence suggests that firms and households were really hit hard and
cash flows were, for some time, heavily used to repay debts, maybe much in excess of
what strikes as ''optimal''.
Finally, we do not think that extending the sample back in time would have provided us
with information that matches the current one in terms of quality and comparability of the
observations. Restructuring in the banking sector is one factor that weakens comparability.
The switch from a fixed exchange rate (or a target zone) regime to a flexible one in late
1992 as well as the switch in monetary policy strategy to inflation targeting a little later is
another important factor. In the potentially longer sample the latter would have had reper-
cussions on the identification of exogenous monetary policy shocks. In particular, using
the Bank of Finland tender rate to construct monetary policy shocks rests on firmer ground
during the time span mostly covered by our sample.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section briefly reviews the boom-bust period
of the Finnish economy following financial market liberalisation in the 1980's. The em-
phasis will be on the credit cycle, starting with the lending boom of the late 1980's, the
                                                
13 During the period from the beginning of 1995 till the end of 1998 the equity-to-asset ratio of the banking
sector increased by approximately 25 %.
14 See Vihriälä (1997) for an extensive analysis of the Finnish banking crisis and, in particular, for a discussion
of the hypothesis that problems due to moral hazard were present in the crisis.
15 Kinnunen and Vihriälä (1999, p. 7).
subsequent financial collapse and banking crisis. Section three discusses the specifications
employed in the empirical analysis. The post crisis evolution of the Finnish banking sectorECB • Working Paper No 100 • December 2001 10
is briefly reviewed in section four. As also observed elsewhere in the context of financial
Tables summarising the data as well as the estimation results are relegated to appendices.
2. The boom-bust period of the Finnish economy
2.1 Lending booms: the interplay of strong credit growth, high asset prices and high per-
ceived net worth
The Finnish boom-bust period from the late 1980's to early 1990's is remarkably similar to
the experiences of many other economies, both developed and emerging markets, that de-
regulated their financial markets in the 1980's and 1990's. What is perhaps different in the
Finnish case, relative to the developed economies, is the amplitude of the boom-bust cy-
cle, and, accordingly, of the underlying credit cycle.
Financial market deregulation in Finland was followed by a boom both of the aggregate
output and, in particular, of bank lending in the latter half of the 1980's. From the level of
about 3 % p.a., the growth rate of the real GDP increased to 5.7 % p.a. in 1989. During the
same time, the aggregate unemployment rate went down to approximately 3 %, implying
that the labour markets were indeed very tight towards the end of the cycle. The timing of
some of the measures to deregulate the financial markets - liberalisation of parts of the
capital flows, the lifting of the interest rate ceilings on bank loans – preceded a period of
strong cyclical growth of the Finnish economy. The strong cyclical growth performance of
the economy was partly initiated and certainly sustained by the large positive terms of
trade shocks that occurred after the oil prices went down in the mid 1980's.  From the be-
ginning of 1985 to the end of 1989 the terms of trade of the Finnish economy improved
almost 25 %, almost 2/3 of which took place only within the first two years.
The rapid cyclical expansion of the Finnish economy was boosted by the accompanying
lending boom. From the mid 1980's to the end of the decade, the ratio of aggregate lend-
ing to nominal GDP – the inverse of credit velocity - increased about 50 %. During the
lending boom, credit was extended, in particular, to the non-tradable sector as the increase
crises, the post crisis period in Finland is characterised by a restructuring of the banking 
sector. Section four also presents the data, informs the reader about the estimation method
Section five concludes. used in the empirical analysis and reviews the estimation results. ECB • Working Paper No 100 • December 2001  11
in internal funds (of firms) permitted more borrowing. The boom in the non-tradable sec-
tor shows up in an increase in the relative price of non-tradables; from the end of 1988 till
the end of 1990 the relative price of non-tradables increased by approximately 10 %.
16
That credit to the private sector increases so quickly is an essential part of a lending boom,
which, in turn, has become the cornerstone of recent theories of financial and banking cri-
ses.
17 The underlying idea is that since leverage increases and since financing is extended
to ever riskier project, banking sector exposure and vulnerability increases as does the
likelihood of a banking crisis. The precise origins of lending booms could be diverse.
They could arise from a poorly regulated financial market liberalisation, a surge in capital
inflow or a terms-of-trade shock that boost domestic investment and consumption.
18 In
any case, the outcome was a sharp increase in firm and household indebtedness as well as
a steep rise in asset prices. The exchange rate could not be relied upon to smooth out the
rapid expansion, since the economy operated under a target zone regime during the period.
However, the strong edge of the exchange rate band was shifted downwards in the heyday
of the expansion - springtime 1989 - to allow for the (nominal effective) exchange rate to
appreciate by approximately 4 %.
At the mature stage of the expansion, monetary policy was tightened
19 and a little later,
late in 1990 and especially in early 1991, the economy was hit by large external shocks.
On top of the cyclical downturn, there was a collapse in the trade with the former Soviet
Union,
20 the outcome of which was an increase in the interest rates, increased pressure
against the FIM and eventually, in November 1991, a substantial devaluation
21 of the FIM.
However, (speculative) pressure against the FIM continued and the authorities took the
                                                
16 The real appreciation of the non-tradable sector relieves its debt burden, leaves the sector with more internal
funds, thus allowing more borrowing. Investment demand, in particular, rises, driving even further up the price
of non-tradable. The analysis in Schneider and Tornell (2000) puts a heavy emphasis on this interplay of the
real exchange rate - relative price of non-tradables - and credit which allows the demand for non-tradables to
outpace the supply. In the resulting 'self-feeding frenzy', the non-tradable sector fuels its own boom (p. 3).
17 See e.g. Gourinchas et al. (2001).
18 Gourinchas et al. (2001, p. 2). Whether financial market liberalisation was poorly regulated in Finland is
still debated. However, the other origins of lending booms alluded to in the main text appear to apply well in
the case of Finland.
19 Towards the end of the 1980's the Bank of Finland introduced a special arrangement or prudential tool,
'speed limits' on the growth of credit, to monitor the rate of growth of bank lending. According to the system
design, excessive bank lending was penalised. The system may have not been entirely effective, given the high
perceived profitability of extending bank credit.
20 In June 1991 Finland unilaterally decided to peg the FIM to the ECU. Formerly, the exchange rate was
quoted in terms of the trade weighted basket. Soon after the decision to peg to the ECU, the FIM depreciated
within the band towards the weak edge of the band.
21 I.e. realignment of the official band for the FIM.ECB • Working Paper No 100 • December 2001 12
decision in September 1992 to allow the FIM to float. Thereafter the FIM continued to
depreciate so that in the spring of 1993, at its weakest, it had lost almost 40 % of its value
in November 1991, prior to the devaluation.
2.2 The collapse: asset values drop, banks' vulnerability increases
In the three year period of 1991-93 output losses amounted to approximately 13 % in the
aggregate, while aggregate unemployment rate quintupled from around 4 % in 1991 to 20
% in 1993. Also, stock prices fell by two-thirds and housing prices halved. The latter, in
particular, may have increased banks' exposure considerably, since it is, by a large margin,
the main household asset and since a fair amount of speculative investment, to a large ex-
tent financed by bank lending, was allocated to housing markets and real estate over the
boom period.
22 The resulting collapse resembles a lot the basic facts of the Great Depres-
sion during the 1930-33 period in the US.
23 The ratio of loans to the nominal GDP
dropped over 30 % from the last quarter of 1992 to the end of 1995 period,
24 the (M1) ve-
locity fell 10-15 % during the same period, the currency/deposit ratio increased approxi-
mately 25 % while the loan/deposit ratio dropped about 35 % during the period, and, fi-
nally, the ex post real interest rates increased from about 7.5 % to 12 % from mid 1991 to
mid 1992. Banks saw debt service difficulties mounting, an ever-increasing share of their
outstanding credits becoming non-performing as well as the number of bankruptcies mul-
tiplying.
25
Finnish banks experienced growing liquidity and solvency problems. A major commercial
bank (Skopbank), which also functioned as the ''central bank'' of the some of the savings
banks, failed already in the fall of 1991. The bank was subsequently taken over by the
Bank of Finland. The government started to intervene more heavily, initially in the form
of establishing asset management companies to manage the insolvent banks. Later it pro-
vided a guarantee that despite the crisis the banks could continue to honour their commit-
ments. More specifically, a state guarantee on the contractual commitments of the Finnish
deposit banks was introduced as a result of the Parliamentary resolution in early 1993,
                                                
22 Allen and Gale (1998, 2001), in particular, emphasise and offer a model of credit dependent asset price be-
haviour, which have the potential of explaining bubbly asset price dynamics.
23 See e.g. Cooper and Corbae (2001, p. 19).
24 And continued to fall essentially till the end of 1997.
25 The number of bankruptcies doubled during the 1990-1992 period are remained persistently high till 1995
(Vihriälä and Kinnunen, 1999, p. 9, Figure 1).ECB • Working Paper No 100 • December 2001  13
which resolution was rescinded by the Parliament only in December 1998.
26 In addition to
the general guarantees the government also provided banks with capital support.
The government took support measures to prevent a generalised ''credit crunch'' emerging
from the difficulties in the banking system. However, despite the bank support commit-
ments
27 amounting to about 16 % of GDP (FIM 80 billion), the amount of bank lending
continued to decline. In particular, the growth of the GDP, which, driven by exports,
started to recover already in late 1993, was followed by an increase in banks' credit stocks
only as late as 1997. Note, interestingly, that the relative price of non-tradables started to
edge up around mid 1996, suggesting that domestic demand started then to show
(stronger) signs of recovery. However, judging by the subsequent behaviour of the relative
price of non-tradables, (excess) demand pressure in the non-tradable sector has never in
the post 1996 period been as strong as it was prior to the onset of the recession in early
1990's. This relatively slow expansion of the non-tradable sector shows up, in particular,
in the historically high and persistent surpluses in the trade balance and current account
since mid 1990's; the average post 1995 trade balance (current account surplus) amounts
to about 8 % of the GDP (4.5 %).
After the collapse of the ERM peg in late 1992, the more or less common perception was
that high employment and activity levels became increasingly difficult to defend using
fiscal policy measures, because public sector indebtedness started to increase at an unsus-
tainable rate. Indeed, the central government debt increased from about 10 % of GDP in
1990 to approximately 70 % of GDP in 1996. Consequently, the focus in fiscal policy
shifted towards stabilising the public debt (relative to the GDP). Also, the effectiveness of
the conventional fiscal multipliers may be suspect at high and increasing levels of the
public debt.
28 Post collapse monetary policy, on the other hand, after adopting the inflation
target in February 1993 moved relatively quickly to lower steering rates. After peaking at
18.45 % in late 1992, the Bank of Finland tender rate hovered around 5 % in 1994, in-
creased to 6 % in 1995 before starting, in late 1995 on decisions by the Bank of Finland,
29
                                                
26 The Finnish deposit insurance scheme was revised at the start of 1998. Depositors' claims are in the new
scheme protected by means of a new deposit guarantee fund. The most significant change from the depositor's
perspective is perhaps that instead of full protection, there is now an upper limit – FIM 150 000 - on the guar-
antee per depositor per bank. For further details, see e.g. Valori and Vesala (1998).
27 Include capital injections to asset management companies.
28 See e.g. Sutherland (1997).
29 From December 1994 onwards the Bank of Finland consistently opted for fixed price tenders in its main
liquidity operations. In these tenders the Bank of Finland fixed the price of liquidity so that the quantity ofECB • Working Paper No 100 • December 2001 14
to fall again, reaching 3 % in fall 1996. Thereafter, till the end of 1998, the path of the
Bank of Finland tender remained relatively flat.
The following chart nicely summarises the economic background of our study.
Chart 1. Output and loan growth in Finland.
2.3 Literature on the role of financial factors in macroeconomic adjustment in Finland
As argued above the general pattern observed in the development of some key macroeco-
nomic variables is consistent with an operative financial accelerator in the Finnish growth
experience during, in particular, the period from late 1980's to mid 1990's. Moreover, a
number of studies have produced econometric evidence suggesting that borrower balance
sheets occupied a critical role in the growth cycle. For example, Brunila (1994) finds in a
panel of Finnish firms covering most of the boom-bust cycle that their investments in
fixed assets was adversely affected by indebtedness, whereas a positive contribution over
                                                                                                                                      
liquidity was determined in the tenders. Previously, the Bank of Finland tended to use fixed quantity tenders,
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time could be found from cash flow. Honkapohja and Koskela (1999), using a similar
panel data set, conclude that the sensitivity of investment to cash flow is higher among
firms classified, a priori, as financially constrained. The time series evidence in Kajanoja
(1995) agrees with Honkapohja and Koskela.
30
As far as the role of financial intermediaries in generating the growth cycle is concerned,
we need, as is well known, some identification scheme which would enable us to infer
from the data that supply rather than demand factors accounted for the behaviour of banks'
credit stocks. Saarenheimo (1995) worked on such a scheme in his empirical analysis
based on a VAR consisting of bank loans, money, the loan rate and fixed investment. His
results suggest that new additions to credit stocks accounted for most of the increase in the
level of private fixed investment during the boom years of 1987-1990. The flip side of his
results is that during the bust years investment would have been higher were there no
shocks to credit. In terms of size credit appears to have affected investment asymmetri-
cally; effects appeared to be larger during the boom years.
Vihriälä's (1997) panel data analysis, on the other hand shows, that savings banks that
were weak in terms of capital and costs were much more aggressive in expanding during
the boom years, even after controlling for demand factors. He interprets this as stemming
from moral hazard, and observes that this distorted supply behaviour accounted for all the
difference in credit growth between the aggregate of savings banks and the co-operative
banks. However, the evidence on the role of banks' supply behaviour during the crisis
years is more ambiguous. No evidence of a credit crunch could be found, although weak
asset quality - measured by the share of non-performing assets to total assets - appears to
have had an adverse effect on bank lending. Finally, Kinnunen and Vihriälä (1999) ex-
amine the role of bank relationships in business closures during the crisis years. Using a
unique panel data set, the authors were able to identify those firms that had a relationship
with the most troubled part of the banking sector, the Savings Bank of Finland and the
Skopbank. They conclude that firms that had a lending relationship with the savings banks
concerned were more likely to close in 1992 than other firms that year or same firms in
other years. They interpret this result as giving support to the hypothesis that financial
                                                
30 According to the further evidence provided by Honkapohja and Koskela, financial factors appears to have
played a role also in the behaviour of private consumption (wealth and liquidity effects) as well as in the dy-
namic behaviour of prices and wages, which were affected by indebtedness.ECB • Working Paper No 100 • December 2001 16
factors affect the real economy not only through firm and household finances but also
through bank behaviour.
3. Model specifications
The approach taken here to explain observed variations in the growth rate of bank loans in
Finland during the latter half of the 1990's builds on the now very standard specification
introduced and analysed by Kashyap and Stein (KS, 1995). In the KS specification, the
observed variation in growth rate of bank loans is explained by which, in particular, fo-
cuses on the effects of the interaction between size and monetary policy shocks on banks'
loan supply behaviour, that we estimated takes the following form
where
•   The subindex i refers to bank i
•   LogLi denotes the (natural) log of bank's i loans
•   MP is the monetary policy shock or indicator
•   Z refers to bank specific explanatory variables (a measure of the size, liquidity and
capitalisation of a bank)
•   the function g denotes transformation of the bank specific variable; in the present
study we use deviations of the bank specific variables from their cross sectional
means, so that the transformation g is defined as
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•   X denotes the vector of control variables (GDP growth, GDP inflation, policy
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•   υυ υ υ  is the error term
•   ()
p
pL L L L α α α α − − − − = 
2
2 1 1 is the autoregressive lag polynomial, whose
roots are outside the unit circle
•   ()
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3 2 1  is the distributive lag polynomial for
monetary policy shocks
•   ()
r T
r




2 1 0 is the (vector form of the) distributive
lag polynomial for the exogenous controls X; 
T refers to transposition
Our default is to set p=4, q=3 and r=3.
31 Writing out the relevant lag polynomials, putting
the lagged dependent variables on the r.h.s. of the test equation and using the transforma-
tion of the bank specific variable, we can rewrite the model in a slightly different form
which in an unbalanced panel such as ours is valid for for t=5,6,… ,T
i, where T
i denotes
the number of time periods available for bank i:
Consequently, on top of the autoregressive part, the model posits linear effects from
monetary policy shocks and bank specific characteristics as well as first order interaction
effects of monetary policy shocks and bank specific characteristics on banks' loan growth.
The vector of controls,  t X , essentially consists of lagged GDP growth as well as of
lagged GDP inflation. These serve as a set of aggregate demand controls or as proxies for
demand shocks. It would be highly desirable to incorporate in each bank's loan growth
equation control information about the bank's customers, but unfortunately this informa-
tion is not available to us. In addition to these demand controls, the X-vector also incorpo-
rates a policy dummy, denoted by D98 in what follows, that is supposed to capture the
effects of the support measures introduced by the government to prevent a generalised
                                                
31 The decision to work on, basically, four lags was based on earlier experimentation with the model. A dy-
namically more parsimonious model, with e.g. two lags, did not perform as well the present specification. This
shows up, in particular, in the fourth lag of the AR- as well as the DL-polynomials (for GDP growth and in-
flation) being highly significant.
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credit crunch from emerging, as argued earlier. Since the Parliament lifted the government
guarantee on banks' loan commitments in December 1998, this dummy switches off (to
zero) from the beginning of 1999.
32 Note, finally, that the postulated specification does not
allow for GDP growth – inflation interaction terms nor interaction between policy shocks
and these aggregate controls. This choice merely reflects our modelling assumptions.
Note that there is an underlying identification scheme that enables us to use this specifica-
tion to quantify the effects of monetary policy shocks on loan supply using and to assess
whether there are differential response to these policy shocks among different types of
banks. Among other things, this scheme requires that the β  - coefficients do not depend on
the parameters of an individual customer's demand for loan function. Of course, alterna-
tive identification schemes could conceivably be imposed and tested given that an appro-
priate data set was available.
To be more specific and formal, the static core of the above dynamic specification can be
given e.g. the following theoretical interpretation.
33 In a highly simplistic model banks
grant loans 
b L , issue deposits 
b D , purchase bonds
b B  and hold reserves R , with the
following balance constraint:
b b b D B L R = + +
The quantity of money is exogenously determined by the multiplier mechanism (reserve
requirements):  α / R D
b = , where α  denotes the reserve requirement ratio. Households
allocate their savings into bank deposits and bonds, government finances its real expendi-
ture by the reserves it borrows from the banks and by issuing bonds. The money market
equilibrium can then simply be written as  () B
h r y D R , α = , where the superscript refers to
households, y denotes households' real income and  B r  is the interest rate on bonds. The
interaction between banks and firms, on the other hand, follows Bernanke and Blinder
(1988). Firms have two possibilities for financing their investments; they can either issue
bonds or borrow from the banks. Bank loans are imperfect substitutes for bonds. If we
                                                
32 The details are given in section 4, where we present the data as well as the estimation method and results.
33 The presentation here follows Freixas and Rochet (1997, ch. 6). Note that we mainly want to highlight the
relationship policy related (market) interest rate movements and changes in banks' loan supply with this small
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Investment depend negatively on both interest rates. The supply of bonds by firms,
f B , on
the other hand, depends negatively on the interest rate on bonds  B r  and positively on the
interest rate on bank loans  L r . Finally, loan demand by firms, 
f L , depends positively
(negatively) on the interest rate on bonds (loans).
Portfolio optimisation by banks results in
() () R r r B and R r r L L B
b
L B
b , , ν µ = =
with  L B r r ∂ ∂ < < ∂ ∂ / 0 / µ µ  and  B L r r ∂ ∂ < < ∂ ∂ / 0 / ν ν  and with
() () () α α ν µ / 1 , , − = + L B L B r r r r . Now, equilibrium in the goods market (IS-curve) is
given by  () ( ) B L B r y S G r r I , , = + , where S(.) denotes real savings, while equilibrium in
the credit market reads as  () () R r r r r L L B L B
f , , µ = . The credit market equilibrium implies
that the equilibrium interest rate is given by  () R r r B L , φ =  for some function φ  with




B B µ µ φ  and
() [ ] 0 / / / / < ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ R r r L R L L
f µ µ φ . Consequently, the quantity of loans in a
credit market equilibrium, L , is given by
() [] R r r L B B , ,φ µ =
where the unsuperscripted loan variable signifies the quantity of loans in equilibrium. In
general, then, the equilibrium quantity of loans will depend, through the interest rate func-
tion φ , on the parameters of the loan demand function (by firms).
34
Without further restrictions we cannot a priori determine how the equilibrium quantity of
loans will respond to an increase in the market rate  B r , let alone identify the supply of
loans behaviour through focusing only on the credit market equilibrium. To this end, as-
                                                
34 Note that the equilibrium in the goods and money market will determine output and the market rate in the
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sume that  0 < ⋅ +
B L B r r r φ µ µ
35 and that there is no heterogeneity across firms in the re-
sponse of their loan demand to changes in either the market rate  B r  or the loan rate  L r .
36
The first one of these assumptions is consistent with the idea that there is stickiness in the
interest rate structure – or restricted pass through – in the sense that the equilibrium loan
rate  L r  does not respond too strongly to movements in the market rate  B r .
37  Under these
conditions an increase in the market rate rB, cet. par., leads to a reduction in the equilib-
rium quantity of (an individual bank's) credit essentially through a dominant adverse loan
supply effect. Reasoning along these lines is used in the empirical part of the paper where
the maintained is that monetary policy shocks impinge negatively on bank lending.
In what follows, we shall focus entirely on loans, ie. we shall not present, in this paper,
results from estimating analogous specifications for bank deposits. We do have a corre-
sponding set of estimation results for deposits too, which can be summarise briefly as
follows.
38
the indicator for monetary policy shocks and, on the other hand, whether the policy
dummy D98 is included in the test equation. Without the policy dummy the aggregate a
well as long-run effect of policy shocks on deposit growth tends to be negative, as ex-
pected. The aggregate and long-run effects of interest rate shocks on deposit growth are,
estimates, particular of the aggregate demand controls.
Before we go on to estimate different variants of the above specification, we note that we
allow for time invariant individual effects, η i, to enter the model specification. In a sta-
tionary level regression, the economic interpretation of the individual effects would be in
terms of differential, bank specific long-run loan levels or individual specific random
                                                
35 The subscripts refer to the relevant partial derivatives.








∂  do not depend on firm characteristics.
37 Given, naturally, the response of a bank's optimal portfolio to changes in the loan rate as embedded in par-
tial 
L r µ .
38  These results are available from the authors upon request.
emerge, on the one hand, whether one uses the tender rate or the money market rate as
however, positive with the money market rate. With the policy dummy these effects are 
negative on both measures of interest related monetary policy shocks. 1- and 2-step estimator 
generally agree on these conclusions. However, overall the models perform poorly both 
in  terms of the specification tests as well as in terms of many of the individual coefficient
 As for the effects of monetary policy shocks, the results suggest that differencesECB • Working Paper No 100 • December 2001  21
components (long-run random fluctuations around a fixed mean), depending on the
econometric interpretation of the η is as fixed or random effects. The interpretation in the
present context is, however, different, since we are modelling the growth rate of bank
loans. In this context the η i parameters are associated with different deterministic trends
η it. These trends can be randomly different depending on the assumptions made about the
η is. Anyway, a natural interpretations of the individual effects appears to be, then, that of
individually specific deterministic trends.
39
In some contexts postulating a data generating process that allows for the presence of in-
dividually deterministic trends may be useful due to some individually specific "growth"
characteristics. However, similar line of reasoning need not, at least not without further
qualifications, apply here. The reason is that bank loans cannot grow on a linear trend
relative to the nominal GDP, which could be the case in the present context, if the indi-
vidual deterministic trends enter unrestrictedly. This suggests that caution should be exer-
cised when thinking about using the model in e.g. a forecasting context. In particular, eco-
nomic reasoning suggests that trends in bank loans and in the GDP have to agree, so that
on average (ie. in the aggregate) there is no (linear) trend in bank loans relative to the
GDP. However, we do not throw away the idea that individual bank specific characteris-
tics impinge upon a bank's loan growth - it is, in itself, a useful modelling assumption - so
that we work with the specification in equation (2).
4. Data, estimation method and results
4.1 Data: Evolution of the structure of the Finnish banking system
Some of the features in the evolution of the Finnish banking system may, in the end, in-
troduce qualifications to any bank specific analysis of the credit channel of monetary pol-
icy transmission in Finland. The reasons underlying the special nature of the Finnish
banking sector are related, in general, to the small size of the Finnish economy and, more
specifically so, to the banking crisis of the early 1990s.
                                                
39 For an overview of non-stationary panel data analysis, see Phillips and Moon (1999), where they also push
forward the interpretation of the individual effects as individually deterministic trends. For a very thorough
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Overall the Finnish banking market has, past and present, been characterised by the exis-
tence of both a small number of dominant players and a large number of small local
banks. This type of heterogeneity among the banks - a bipolar nature of the banking sector
- potentially makes it more difficult to draw general conclusions concerning the compara-
tive behaviour of the banks of different types. To take a concrete example, the small num-
ber of large banks may result in giving a (disproportionately) large weight to some random
factors impinging on the banking business.
Moreover, there may exist challenging difficulties in associating banks with their effective
bank specific characteristics. In case of Finland, this particular difficulty manifests itself
most clearly in the OKO Bank Group of co-operative banks (, which includes roughly 240
co-operative banks). While these co-operative banks act as independent entities in the
credit market,
40 they are presently in closer cooperation, and have been so especially since
1997 when a re-organisation of the group was carried out. At that time, some of the co-
operative banks (about 40) rejected the proposed form of co-operation in the OKO Bank
Group and established another group for co-operation.
More often than not, the post crisis recovery of economies involved, in particular, re-
structuring and reorganising the banking sector or, more generally, the financial sector.
Finland is no exception to this rule. Perceived over-capacity in the banking sector was re-
duced and, at the same time, concentration further increased in the banking industry. Be-
fore the banking crisis, five major banking groups dominated, in terms of the respective
market shares, the banking markets. Currently, the number of major players has gone
down to three (Nordea/Merita, OKO Bank Group with local co-operative banks, and
Sampo-Leonia). Currently, the aggregate market share of these groups is approximately
80 %. As explained earlier, the most important steps in the reorganisation of the Finnish
banking sector were taken when the Savings Bank of Finland was split among the four
rival banking groups in 1993, and when Kansallis-Osake-Pankki and Unitas merged into
Merita Bank in 1995.
                                                
40 OKO Bank Consolidated consists of the parent bank OKO Bank, the subsidiaries Okopankki Oyj, OP-
Finance Ltd, Opstock Ltd and OKO Venture capital Ltd. The OKO Bank Group, on the other hand, is com-
prised of 244 independent member co-operative banks and Group's statutory central institution, OKO Bank
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Despite these relatively dramatic changes in the Finnish banking sector, it is evident that
the individual co-operative banks are independent entities. Consequently  they enter the
panel of banks as different banks with the end result that the cross sectional dimension of
the panel is of an order higher than the time dimension. We are here arguing that under the
prevailing corporate structure the OKO Bank Group should not be aggregated and treated
as a single bank. In statistical terms, then, the cross sectional heterogeneity among the
OKO Bank Group banks can legitimately be utilised in the ensuing statistical analysis on
the banks' loan growth. To put this assumption on a slightly firmer ground, we checked
the cross sectional distributions of loan growth, size, liquidity and capitalisation among
the co-operative banks in the OKO Band Group in the last quarter of each year in the
sample. The intuition here is that if the individual co-operative banks are, in effect, eco-
nomically mere branches, this would show up in a tight, possibly even degenerate support
of the distribution of at least some of the variables listed above. The results are encourag-
ing in the sense that the underlying distributions for the OKO Bank Group appear to dis-
play sufficient hetergeneity and, actually, look very similar to those of other banks.
41
Consequently, we end up using quarterly data on Finnish banks as well as on inflation and
GDP growth covering the period from the beginning of 1995 to the end of 2000, ie. the
sample period is 1995.1 - 2000.4. The maximum number of time periods for a single bank
or the maximum length of an individual time series is thus 24 (T = max T
I = 24), whereas
the cross sections of the panel include 333-347 banks (N=343-347). Hence, the full ca-
pacity of the panel is in the range T⋅ N=8232 to 8328, but since ours is an unbalanced
panel, the effective number of observations is less. Information on altogether nine banks
was removed from the panel. The principal reasons for purging the panel this way were
exit, too short time series and, simply, lack of information. More precisely six of the nine
banks that were removed visited the sample for only one year. No information was avail-
able on two banks and, finally, for one of the banks the panel contained information only
from the last quarter of 1998. Furthermore, since some of the individual time series con-
tain observations that are extreme, a rule for purging the data for these extreme values was
adopted. Specifically, all cross section observations of loan growth rates (log differences
of bank loans) that are located in the lower or upper one percent tail of the distribution are
                                                
41 The graphs of the associated empirical distribution are available from the authors upon request. We esti-
mated our models on data that excluded the co-operative banks altogether and the results are very similar to
those using the whole sample of banks. This is particularly so with respect to the effects of monetary policy
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excluded in the estimations. All these measures and characteristics of the data amount to
having, effectively, 5500-5600 observations in the estimations. Appendix C provides ta-
bles that summarise the main features of our sample on Finnish banks.
There are two main reasons for using such a panel with a relatively small number of time
series observations. First of all, this allows us to partially control for the effects of the
banking crisis in the sense that the worst years associated with the very onset and early
years of the banking crisis are excluded from the sample. The underlying economic idea is
that during these extremely exceptional years, monetary policy cannot have effects any-
thing like those in more normal years. Hence, the first half of our sample can be charac-
terised as a period of returning to normality in the banking business. The fact that the
sample does overlap with the post crisis recovery of the economy, suggests that when
taking a decision on the length of the sample we appear to face a trade-off. That is, we
need to weigh the length of the time series against how representative the sample period is
(relative to normal times). We think we have stricken a good balance. Secondly, due to
restructuring and mergers, the data is not available to us in the same form for time periods
prior to 1995. Consequently, a large amount of effort should have been invested in an at-
tempt to extend to sample in comparable terms beyond 1995. We did not take this ap-
proach, given the highly exceptional years that we could have included by extending the
sample.
There are a number of alternative approaches to identifying monetary policy shocks or to
obtaining an indicator of monetary policy. The SVAR literature uses identification
schemes to identify monetary policy shocks from estimated (residuals of) vectorautore-
gressions incorporating, on top of a number of aggregate variables like a measure of the
output gap and inflation, a feedback rule - e.g. an interest rate or a money rule - for
monetary policy. Initially, we also experimented with such a measure of monetary policy
shocks, which was provided to us by the ECB. The relevant shock series, however, only
covers the period till the end of 1998, which, in our case, means losing a relatively large
ternative measures of policy shocks had to be considered.
We opted for the use of the quarterly change in the Bank of Finland tender rate as the
relevant monetary policy indicator. We extended it with the corresponding change in the
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ECB's main refinancing rate for the post 1999 period. This procedure may not be ideal or
entirely satisfactory, since, as the evidence suggests
42 policy relevant interest rate changes
appear to be autocorrelated, particularly at very high frequencies, so that part of observed
interest rate changes are anticipated. This appears to be less of a problem in e.g. quarterly
data, however. An alternative to using the steering rates is to use a short-term (3M) money
market rate as the basis for the policy indicator variable. Money market rates are also
highly autocorrelated, so that once again a pure change in this interest rate may not be the
ideal approach to measuring exogenous policy shocks. Furthermore, the time series prop-
erties of the money market rate differ considerable from those of the tender rate and this
could show up in the comparative results. Anyway, money market rates have been used in
this type of analyses, so that we also experimented with this alternative measure of policy
shocks.
It turned out that the estimated long-run effects of monetary policy shocks on banks' loan
growth are of the expected (negative) sign. However, the dynamic effects and, more so,
long-run effects (aggregate effects) in particular of GDP growth are not entirely satisfac-
tory in the case where the three months money market rate as the policy indicator.
43 Con-
sequently we decided to report, in the main text, estimation results for the models using
quarterly change in the Bank of Finland tender rate as our monetary policy indicator. Es-
timation results using quarterly changes in the three months money market rate as the
policy indicator are given in Appendix B.
Although they often generally agree, the two indicators produce differences in the details
of the estimation results. Sometimes the short-term money market rate performs better in
terms of specification tests, but more poorly in terms of estimated effects of some of the
variables. One possible explanation for these differences in the estimated short-run dy-
namic effects of policy shocks is in that the generating mechanism underlying the money
market appears to differ considerably from the one underlying the tender rate. Observed
time series on the tender rate could conceivably be modelled as realisations of a jump pro-
cess, or at least of a slowly moving process that is also subject to discrete changes. These
                                                
42 See e.g. Jääskelä and Vilmunen (1999) and the references therein. The authors focus on the Finnish case -
the Bank of Finland tender rate - and argue, that, in the space of random policy steps in particular, consecutive
interest rate changes are highly correlated. This correlation is less pronounced in calendar time, however.
From the point of view of markets, it appears that (anticipated) interest rate changes are less correlated over
longer (forecast) horizon.
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discrete changes either occur infrequently or tend to punch in time. The exact nature of the
process underlying tender rate changes depends critically on the monetary policy operat-
ing procedures of the relevant central bank, especially on the nature of the liquidity man-
agement system and the role of interest rate targeting (signalling policy changes through
the interest rate) therein. Short-term money market rates, on the other hand, are more
likely to be generated by a (combined jump-) diffusion type process.
As mentioned above, Finnish government took measures that would reduce the risk of a
credit crunch emerging as an outcome of the banking crisis. The economic argument here
is that this policy measure must have affected banks' loan supply behaviour, which, con-
sequently, has to be taken into account in the actual estimations. We do this by incorpo-
rating a dummy variable in the model specifications that we estimate. This dummy takes a
value of one as long as the state guarantee for banks' loan commitments was in effect and
zero thereafter. More formally, this means that our dummy, D98, say, is defined as
D98=1, for 1995.1 ≤  t ≤  1998.4, and D98=0, for t ≥  1999.1.
4.2 Estimation method
The specifications are estimated by Generalised Method of Moments or GMM. Since the
lagged dependent variable is included in the estimated model (with unobserved individual
heterogeneity), ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation potentially suffers from not being
consistent in T-finite samples, no matter how large the cross sectional dimension is. The
(N-) asymptotic bias in the Least Squares (LS) estimator can, furthermore, be substantial
in T-small samples (like ours).
44 More specifically, since the OLS does not control for the
possibility of unobserved individual specific effects, it may result in upward-biased esti-
mates of the autoregressive coefficients if these individual specific effects are important.
The Within Groups estimator is OLS after transforming the data to deviations from cross
sectional means. Consequently, it eliminates the individual specific effects but results in
downward-biased estimates of the autoregressive coefficients in T-small panels. GMM in
first differences eliminates individual specific effects by differencing the equations, and
then uses lagged values of endogenous variables as instruments. If the error term in
(growth) levels is serially uncorrelated, then the error term in first differences is MA(1), so
that instruments dated t-2 and earlier should be valid in the differenced equation. Under
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this assumption consistent parameter estimates can be obtained. If, on the other hand, the
error term in (growth) levels is itself MA(1), then only instruments dated t-3 and earlier
will be valid, and so on.
45 In the present application, GMM estimation is carried out by
using the DPD procedure
46 in PcGive10.0.
4.3 Estimation results
We begin by presenting the estimation results for the ''benchmark'' model, which is an
autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model for banks' nominal loan growth using the
monetary policy indicator - quarterly changes in the Bank of Finland tender rate - real
GDP growth rate and inflation rate as explanatory variables. This serves as a useful start-
ing point for the subsequent analysis, where we present the results from estimating more
complex models. In these richer models linear effects of bank specific variables (size, li-
quidity and capitalisation) as well as first order interaction effects from these bank specific
variables and the policy shock also enter the equation to be estimated. Taking this last step
to extend the model and hopefully finding statistically significant bank specific effects, we
gain information about the existence of a bank lending channel in the transmission of
monetary policy shocks to the economy.
Apart from the negative effects of monetary policy shocks – interest rate shocks – on
from our analysis:
•   GDP growth and inflation should enter positively: the relevant distributed lag coeffi-
cients should at least sum to a positive number
•   the linear effects of bank liquidity and capitalisation is expected to be positive (γ Z > 0
for Z = liquidity and capitalisation), whereas we expect size to enter negatively due to
the underlying (implicit) assumption that Finnish bank loan markets exhibit stationary
size distribution (γ Z < 0 for Z = size)
•   the effects of monetary policy is expected to be weaker among larger, more liquid or
better capitalised banks; here the underlying assumption is that size is a proxy for in-
formation frictions or problems (adverse selection, moral hazard) so that smaller
                                                
45 See Bond et al. (1997) and, especially, Bond and Arellano (1991).
46 Arellano and Bond (1988).
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banks, being more opaque, have greater difficulties in restructuring their portfolio of
loans and other assets (δ Z > 0 for all Z)
•   the dummy for the government guarantee of banks loan commitments is expected to
enter positively implying that the policy measure had a positive contribution to banks'
loan growth during its life (θ D98 > 0)
Table A1 in Appendix A summarises the estimation results for this ''benchmark''.
47 Cen-
tered seasonal dummies (as well as a general constant) were also included in the estimated
model, but their estimates are not reported in Table A1. The constant did not enter signifi-
cantly, whereas some of seasonal dummies did. As such, using either of the two estima-
tors, most of the estimated coefficients appear reasonable, both in terms of size and sign.
In particular, all of the coefficients on monetary policy are of the expected negative sign,
as well as of the appropriate size. Also, the implied sum of the distributed lag coefficients
of monetary policy shocks, GDP growth and inflation, as given by the 2-step estimates
Aggregate effects of policy shocks, GDP growth and inflation (2-step)
Variable Policy shocks GDP growth Inflation




indicate that the estimated aggregate effects of monetary policy shocks, changes GDP
growth and inflation are highly significant.
48
The estimated degree of persistence in loan growth appears plausible; the sum of the esti-
mated AR-coefficients about 0.2, implying that shocks to banks' loan growth die out rap-
idly. Note that the estimated coefficient on the fourth lag is clearly dominant in size,
which may be an indication of seasonal variation in loan growth. Three of the estimated
lags for GDP growth are positive - two of them significantly so - while the first lag enters
negatively and significantly. Overall, then, the estimated dynamic and, in particular, long-
                                                
47 Table A2 uses the money market rate in the "benchmark" specification. Otherwise, we report both the so
called 1-step estimates and 2-step estimates as given by PcGive10.0. In the present application, they are very
similar . The two differ in the way the possibly individual specific weighting matrix (in the GMM estimate) is
constructed. The asymptotic variance matrices are heteroscedasticity consistent in both cases. See e.g. Arel-
lano and Bond (1991) for an extended analysis and illustrations.
48 The 1-step estimates for the aggregate effects are similar, as can be readily verified from Table B1. How-
ever, we present the results from the pure significance tests of the aggregate effects only in the case of the 2-
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run or aggregate effects of GDP growth on banks' loan growth are satisfactory.
49 Similar
remarks apply for the inflation rate. It interesting to note that the aggregate effects of in-
flation on banks' loan growth may be just an inch too high for the long-run elasticity of
loan growth w.r.t. inflation to be unity. This outcome would sustain the view that, plausi-
bly, it is the variation in the long-run growth of real credit that our model aims to explain.
The dummy for the state guarantee of banks' (deposit and non-deposit) commitments,
D98, appears to enter very significantly. It also has the expected positive sign, implying
that the policy measures taken to counteract the adverse effects of the crisis on banks' loan
supply appear to have been successful in the sense of contributing positively to banks'
loan growth.
There is a marginal difference between the GDP growth dynamics as implied by the 1-
and 2-step estimates.
50 The latter puts less weight on the first lag and more weight on
longer lags of GDP growth than the former, to the extent that the aggregate effects of GDP
growth on banks' loan growth are higher with the 2-step estimate.
As for the specification itself, the Wald
51 statistics suggest that the independent variables
are jointly significant, while the robust autocorrelation tests, AR(1) and AR(2) tests re-
spectively
52, do not provide evidence to suggest that the assumption of serially uncorre-
lated errors in the equation for the growth rate of bank loans is inappropriate in the present
context. The 1-step AR(2) is somewhat marginal, of course, but does not reject the null of
serially uncorrelated errors in the growth equation at the 5 % significance level. The Sar-
gan test, on the other hand, appears to cast some doubt on the validity of this assumption
so that it may not, in the end, be the most appropriate one. However, simulations in Arel-
lano and Bond (1991) suggest that the 1-step Sargan statistics tends to reject the over-
                                                
49 An earlier version of the paper estimated, using OLS and GMM, loan growth equations by not allowing for
bank specific effects at all in the test equations. These equations performed very poorly. Firstly, the estimated
GDP elasticities were significantly negative and, in absolute terms, twice as large as the inflation elasticities
reported here. The implied leading root of the AR polynomial for the loan growth was much higher, implying
considerably more persistence. Also, the Sargan test statistics was either very marginal (borderline critical) or,
more often so, clearly critical. We concluded that explicit control for unobserved heterogeneity is extremely
important in our case and re-specified the model in order to apply the Arellano - Bond procedure.
50 Of course, as Table A1 readily tells us, there is the bigger difference between the 1- and 2-step estimates in
that the former is more critical about the specification we are using.
51
for the joint significance of the dummies is not reported.
52 The famous m1 and m2 tests of Arellano and Bond (1991).
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identifying restrictions too often in the presence of heteroscedasticity. The 2-step Sargan
test broadly agrees with this in the present context; the p-value for the observed test statis-
tics is 0.132, so that the null (of valid over-identifying restrictions) is not rejected even at
the 10 % significance level. Of course, it is conceivable that these somewhat conflicting
test results - a sign of instability across the different instrument sets - reflects the failure of
the strict exogeneity assumption (for the GDP growth and inflation) rather than serial cor-
relation per se.
There is an interesting difference between the result reported in Table A1, where the Bank
of Finland tender rate is used as the policy indicator, and the case where the three months
money market rate stands as the policy variable (Table A2). First of all, the estimated
market rate is used. This is particularly so with the 1-step GMM estimation. Also, some of
the coefficients are more precisely estimated with the money market rate in the model as
the source of policy shocks. Secondly, some of the estimated coefficients are more rea-
sonable and plausible when the Bank of Finland tender rate enters as the policy variable.
This is particularly so with the estimated coefficients on GDP growth. With the tender rate
only the first lag of GDP growth enters negatively and the aggregate effect - also the long-
run effect of - GDP growth on banks' loan growth is positive. Using the three months
money market rate, however, two of the lags, first and fourth, generally enter with a nega-
tive coefficient with the coefficient on the first lag being the dominant one so that on ag-
gregate (in the long-run), GDP growth appears to impinge negatively on banks' loan
growth.
Thirdly, the estimated dynamic effects of inflation on banks' loan growth are less satis-
factory with the money market rate in the sense that in this case there are more negative
coefficients on the lags. Also, the aggregate effects of inflation on banks' loan growth are
somewhat smaller in this latter case. With the money market rate more generally, smaller
response on loan growth to changes in explanatory variables can be observed in our esti-
mations.
53 Moreover, the results indicate that the model with the money market rate may,
in the end, be more parsimonious in terms of, especially, the distributed lag lengths.
                                                
53 It is quite conceivable that the money market interest rate is more correlated with both the GDP growth and
the inflation rate, and that this shows up in lower coefficient estimates for these variables.
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Overall, we conclude that the estimation results of the ''benchmark'' model provide a satis-
factory starting point for further analysis. Consequently, we proceed to extend the model
to include bank specific variables on top of those incorporated in the benchmark. We will
consider three such bank specific variable, namely size, liquidity and capitalisation. The
underlying economic argument for experimenting with these variables is, first of all, that
banks are not in general irrelevant for the transmission of monetary policy. Secondly, the
implied heterogeneity among the banks along these dimensions is important from the per-
spective of the effects of monetary policy shocks on the economy.
Table B1 reports the 2-step estimation results from adding a particular bank specific vari-
able, each in turn, in the ''benchmark'' specification. The corresponding results using the 1-
step estimator can be found in Table B2, while tables B3 and B4 report these estimates
using the money market rate as the policy variable. The bank specific variables in these
extended specifications enter as deviations from the relevant cross sectional average as
defined earlier by the transformation g.
The second column of the tables (Model I) adds in a size variable, where size is defined in
terms of the log of a bank's assets, as well as its interaction with (all four lags of) the
monetary policy indicator. The third and fourth columns (Model II and Model III) present
the corresponding results for adding in a liquidity variable and a capitalisation variable, in
each case allowing for the interaction of the added variable with the monetary policy indi-
cator. Liquidity is here measured in terms the sum of cash, short-term inter-bank deposits
and government bonds, while capitalisation is defined in terms of each bank's equity-to-
asset ratio. The following table summarises the aggregate effects of monetary policy
shocks, changes in GDP growth and inflation on banks' loan supply in these extended
models, ie. the estimated sums of the distributed lag coefficients
Aggregate effects of policy shocks, GDP growth and inflation (2-step)
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Once again, a (general) constant as well as seasonal dummies were also included in the
estimated model, although their parameter estimates are not reported.
54 As far as "bench-
mark" variables are concerned, the general conclusion about their  parameter estimates in
Table B2 (and B3)  is similar to what was mentioned above in the context of the ''bench-
mark'' model itself.
55 Also, although almost all of the estimated coefficients on the first
order interaction terms enter insignificantly, they appear to be correctly signed. Since e.g.
the size variable has the well-favoured interpretation of being a proxy for the information
frictions faced by different banks – smaller banks being more opaque, thus facing higher
costs of external funding – smaller banks being more opaque, thus facing higher costs of
external funding – our results suggest that monetary policy shocks do not have statistically
significant differential effects on banks' loan growth due to the heterogeneity in these in-
formation costs. However, given that the coefficients are correctly signed, we can specu-
late that the information costs may not be irrelevant, but that our data is just too noisy for
us to be able to pick significant differential effects. Similar line of reasoning seems to ap-
ply to liquidity and capitalisation. Heterogeneity in terms of liquidity and capitalisation
may not be irrelevant, but the signal of their potential importance in our sample is just too
weak. The fact that the estimated aggregate interaction effects are sometimes marginal or
even borderline significant (liquidity and capitalisation) appears give some support to
these conjectures.
As for the estimated linear effects of the bank specific variables, they are also correctly
signed. Liquidity and capitalisation both support stronger loan growth, whereas the bank
size impinges negatively banks' loan growth. We interpret this latter result to indicate that
the market for bank loans in Finland has a stationary size distribution or has a tendency to
converge to a stationary size distribution. Under the alternative outcome, ie. positive size
effect on loan growth, the interpretation would be, when taken to its logical limit, that
bank loan dynamics would have a tendency to generate a monopoly. Or, alternatively, that
markets for bank loans exhibit local scale economies due e.g. small size of a typical bank.
Of course, it is conceivable that loan markets in economies indeed are driven by forces
that generate monopolies, but we feel we are standing firmer on the ground in concluding
in favour of the existence of a nontrivial size distribution in these markets. Finally, note
                                                
54 Overall, the constant is not significant, while some of the seasonal dummies are.
55 A curiosity about the results in Table 4.2 is that the AR polynomial is here even more special in that only
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further that the bank support dummy D98 continues to enter significantly and with a cor-
rect sign.
As for the specifications themselves, the test statistics do not run against the specification,
although this time the outcomes of the specification tests are not as supportive as in the
"benchmark" case.
56 Once again, using the money market rate as the policy indicator,
there is much less evidence against the specifications (Appendix B, tables B3 and B4), but
there is the ''cost'' alluded to above from working with the money market rate, namely that
of being given poor coefficient estimates for some of the explanatory variables.
Across the board, the conclusion that appears to emerge from these estimates is that the
results are marginally more satisfactory in the case where either the liquidity or the capi-
talisation variables is added to the ''benchmark'' specification. One of the reasons is that
the leading root of the AR polynomial on loan growth essentially implies no persistence in
the loan growth process whereas in the ''benchmark'' case as well as in the other two cases
persistence is nontrivial and much more plausible in size. Secondly, a closer look at the
estimated individual AR coefficient estimates indicates that the first three are negative and
others in size. So the dynamics of the estimated ''benchmark'' model with size are not en-
tirely satisfactory, either in the sense that only the fourth lag remains after deleting all the
insignificant lags or in the sense of having dynamics that alternate in sign. However, on
balance, we feel justified in drawing the conclusion from our estimations that there is
weak evidence in favour of the existence of a credit or bank lending channel in Finland.
57
                                                
56 The 1-step estimate are once again more critical about the specification (see Appendix B). In particular, the
tests are now more marginal and often reject the relevant null hypotheses at conventional significance level.
57 As argued earlier in the main text, one reading of the data may give the impression that the (log of the in-
verse of the) credit velocity,  [] t t it Y P L / log , is, over a longer period of time, relatively stable. Since some
of the implied restrictions on our model to transform it into a model for this velocity do not appear to be too
grossly at odds with the estimation results, we also estimated an empirical model for the growth rate of the
credit velocity. We were, in particular, keen on learning how our postulated specification performs in the
specification tests. Much to our surprise, these tests strongly rejected the postulated model of credit velocity
for the Finnish banking data. More specifically, the direct tests on error autocorrelation, i.e. AR(1) and AR(2)
test, were highly critical of the null of serially uncorrelated errors. The Sargan tests for the validity of the
overidentifying restrictions were also highly critical and gave strong support for the autocorrelation tests. Fi-
nally, the observed t-values on some of the variables, most notably of the (near) unit root variables, were ex-
tremely high, being symptomatic of spurious regression among trending variables. Consequently, we simply
rejected this alternative specification as a framework for analysis of the effects of monetary policy shocks on
the loan supply of Finnish banks.
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5. Summary and discussion
We feel that on the basis of our statistical analysis on the Finnish banking data we can
draw some positive and perhaps also promising conclusions concerning the importance of
banks in the transmission of monetary policy shocks in the Finnish economy. In a strict
sense, of course, we cannot draw on any consistent set of evidence from our estimates in
favour of a (broad) credit channel, where the emphasis is mainly on the strength of the
borrowers' balance sheets. However, on the basis of the estimated behaviour of the aggre-
gate demand controls, we are positive that we have been able to provide evidence of de-
mand factors playing an important role in growth of the stock of bank loans in Finland;
real income growth contributes positively to banks' loan growth. Inflation also appears to
impinge positively on banks' loan growth, with the aggregate or long-run effect being
generally larger than that of GDP growth. More arguably, the long-run inflation elasticites
suggest that our specification captures factors affecting the growth rate of the real stock of
bank loans in Finland.
Our results also seem to suggest that bank specific variables like size, liquidity and capi-
talisation have contributed to the growth of bank loans in the 1990's. The direct, linear
effects of banks' liquidity and capitalisation on banks' loan growth are consistently posi-
tive and statistically significant. These imply that banks' liquidity and degree of capitali-
sation are important factors affecting the supply of bank loans. As far as the effects of size
on banks' loans are concerned, the results indicate that the market for bank loans in Fin-
land has a stationary size distribution. That is, bank's size impinges negatively and statisti-
cally significantly on the growth rate of its loans. We think this result is reasonable. A pri-
ori, of course, we could not rule out the alternative scenario, where size enters positively
in the loan growth equation. Such a result could conceivably have been interpreted to in-
dicate a tendency for the bank loan dynamics to generate monopolies. Another interpreta-
tion of our results would suggest local economies of scale in the loan markets populated
by relatively small sized banks.
The bank specific factors have probably also induced heterogeneity among banks in their
response to policy shocks. The evidence on this last point is not, however, entirely com-ECB • Working Paper No 100 • December 2001  35
pelling. In particular, the interactions of monetary policy shocks and bank characteristics
do not, in most cases, enter the model in a statistically significant way. There is some in-
dication that at least some of these interactions could be important, but here we lack con-
sistency in the results. As far as the size of the coefficients on these interactions is con-
cerned, they appear to be plausible on both economic and statistical terms.
Finally, the dummy for Parliamentary guarantee on banks' deposit and non-deposit com-
mitments enters the model significantly. In terms of the underlying policy measures, the
results indicate that these measures had a positive contribution to the increase in the growth
rate of banks' loans.ECB • Working Paper No 100 • December 2001 36
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APPENDIX A
Banks' loan growth and monetary policy shocks: money market rate
Table A1 The effects of monetary policy on the growth rate of loans:




loan growtht-1 0.0602 (0.0261)
** 0.0542 (0.0292)
*
loan growtht-2 0.0206 (0.0221) 0.0157 (0.0230)
loan growtht-3 0.0117 (0.0190) 0.0093 (0.0196)
loan growtht-4 0.1265 (0.0205)
*** 0.1158 (0.0211)
***
Σ AR coeffs  0.2190
** 0.1950
**
gdp growtht-1 -0.2676 (0.0894)
** -0.1954 (0.0936)
**
gdp growtht-2 0.2495 (0.0926)
** 0.2613 (0.0955)
**
gdp growtht-3 0.4704 (0.1285)
*** 0.4736 (0.1398)
***
gdp growtht-4 0.1801 (0.1585) 0.1820 (0.1733)
Σ gdp coeffs 0.6324
** 0.7215
**









inflt-4  0.0724 (0.1144) 0.0775 (0.1206)
























2(221) (p-value) 366.1 (0.000)
*** 244.6 (0.132)
AR(1) test N(0,1) (p-value) -13.97 (0.000)
*** -10.93 (0.000)
***
AR(2) test N(0,1) (p-value) -1.946 (0.052)
* -0.6394 (0.523)
1 *, ** and *** mean significant at 10, 5 and 1 % significance level respectively in a pure significance test
2 Estimated heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors in parenthesisECB • Working Paper No 100 • December 2001 40





loan growtht-1 0.0651 (0.0256)
** 0.0639 (0.0284)
**
loan growtht-2 0.0200 (0.0219) 0.0142 (0.0233)
loan growtht-3 0.0202 (0.0193) 0.0193 (0.0197)
loan growtht-4 0.1248 (0.0202)
*** 0.1158 (0.0211)
***
Σ AR coeffs 0.2301 0.2132
gdp growtht-1 -0.3408 (0.1098)
** -0.2862 (0.1142)
**
gdp growtht-2 0.2010 (0.0939)
** 0.2114 (0.0984)
**
gdp growtht-3 0.2350 (0.1524) 0.2232 (0.1661)
gdp growtht-4 -0.1436 (0.1748) -0.1640 (0.1903)







inflt-3 0.3245 (0.2192) 0.3328 (0.2364)
inflt-4 -0.1932 (0.1434) -0.1779 (0.1508)




mopot-2 -0.2193 (0.5809) -0.3359 (0.6292)
mopot-3 -0.2946 (0.3467) -0.3568 (0.3705)
mopot-4 -0.4060 (0.3447) -0.3710 (0.3600)









2(221) (p-value) 345.1 (0.000)
*** 238.4 (0.201)
AR(1) test N(0,1) (p-value) -14.04 (0.000)
*** -11.08 (0.000)
***
AR(2) test N(0,1) (p-value) -1.342 (0.180) -0.3017 (0.763)
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APPENDIX  B
Banks' loan growth, size, liquidity and capitalisation: 1-step, 2-step and the policy
indicator
Table B1 Monetary policy shocks, the growth rate of loans, bank size, liquidity




1 Model I Model II Model III
loan growtht-1 -0.0006 (0.0307) 0.0439 (0.0297) 0.0339 (0.0290)
loan growtht-2  -0.0278 (0.0240) 0.0094 (0.2330) 0.0044 (0.0229)
loan growtht-3 -0.0241 (0.0196) 0.0007 (0.0198) 0.0020 (0.0198)




Σ AR coeffs 0.0405 0.1635
** 0.1495
**












gdp growtht-4 0.1801 (0.1644) 0.1974 (0.1694) 0.1681 (0.1721)















inflt-4 0.0753 (0.1169) 0.0859 (0.1193) 0.0709 (0.1186)





** -1.9778 (0.8427) -1.8979 (0.8439)
**
mopot-2 -1.2696 (0.9213) -1.2218 (0.9626) -1.1805 (0.9650)
mopot-3 -0.7021 (0.2323)
*** -0.7194 (0.2474) -0.6648 (0.2464)
***
mopot-4 -0.5843 (0.3542)
* -0.5903 (0.3568) -0.5720 (0.3615)
*











2 -0.1625 (0.1518) -0.3360 (2.471) 0.9585 (5.6242)
interactiont-2 0.1764 (0.1825) 4.240 (2.832) 6.647 (6.255)
interactiont-3 0.0137 (0.1032) -2.594 (1.620) 0.8638 (4.607)
interactiont-4 0.0619 (0.1059) 3.133 (1.396)
** 1.673 (3.376)













2(221) (p-value) 246.9 (0.076)
* 243.9 (0.139) 246.6 (0.114)




AR(2) N(0,1) (p-value) -0.6761 (0.499) -0.6953 (0.487) -0.7109 (0.477)
1 See Table A1 for comments and explanations
2 Interactiont-j refers to the j
th coefficient δ j, j=1,2,3,4, in the sum  () [] 
=
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1 Model I Model II Model III
loan growtht-1 -0.0057 (0.0274) 0.0527 (0.0267)
** 0.0348 (0.0261)
loan growtht-2 -0.0314 (0.0235) 0.0168 (0.0226) 0.0013 (0.0220)
loan growtht-3 -0.0273 (0.0193) 0.0036 (0.0189) -0.0021 (0.0189)




Σ AR coeffs 0.0309 0.1939 0.1491












gdp growtht-4 0.1381 (0.1543) 0.1832 (0.1572) 0.1601 (0.1581)













inflt-4 0.0383 (0.1117) 0.0694 (0.1140) 0.0574 (0.1140)










mopot-4 -0.5376 (0.3381) -0.6392 (0.3436)
* -0.6187 (0.3449)
*







interactiont-1 -0.1358 (0.1598) -1.3815 (2.236) 0.3718 (5.486)
interactiont-2 0.1660 (0.2047) 4.437 (2.471)
* 7.480 (6.179)
interactiont-3 0.0576 (0.1164) -2.998 (1.487)
** -1.963 (4.409)
interactiont-4 0.0525 (0.1245) 2.523 (1.330)
* 1.464 (3.696)
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1 Model I Model II Model III
loan growtht-1 -0.0023 (0.02729) 0.0582 (0.0261)
*' 0.0402 (0.0256)
**
loan growtht-2 -0.0350 (0.0238) 0.0156 (0.0223) 0.0003 (0.0218)
loan growtht-3 -0.0202 (0.0193) 0.0123 (0.0192) 0.0068 (0.0191)
















gdp growtht-3 0.2315 (0.1463) 0.2361 (0.1509) 0.2125 (0.1520)
gdp growtht-4 -0.1302 (0.1685) 0.1355 (0.1734) -0.1541 (0.1733)












inflt-3 0.3353 (0.2117) 0.3261 (0.2168) 0.3011 (0.2182)
inflt-4 -0.1745 (0.1385) -0.1969 (0.1425) -0.2062 (0.1421)








mopot-2 -0.3437 (0.5589) -0.2445 (0.5751) -0.2170 (0.5754)
mopot-3 -0.4078 (0.3342) -0.3018 (0.3426) -0.2763 (0.3447)
mopot-4 -0.4174 (0.3344) -0.3869 (0.3424) -0.3809 (0.3415)










interactiont-1 -0.1107 (0.082) 0.3775 (1.202) 3.042 (2.864)
interactiont-2 0.0812 (0.0990) 1.269 (1.240) 2.508 (2.675)
interactiont-3 -0.0289 (0.0786) -1.496 (1.107) 1.880 (2.414)
interactiont-4 0.1086 (0.0991) 2.452 (1.037)
** -0.2032 (2.279)



















AR(2) N(0,1) (p-value) -1.330 (0.183) -1.651 (0.099)
* -1.355 (0.175)
1 See Table A1 for comments and explanationsECB • Working Paper No 100 • December 2001 44




1 Model I Model II Model III
loan growtht-1 0.0009 (0.0306) 0.0558 (0.0284)
** 0.0392 (0.0279)
loan growtht-2 -0.0314 (0.0249) 0.0080 (0.0235) -0.0003 (0.0233)
loan growtht-3 -0.0161 (0.0195) 0.0101 (0.0199) 0.0110 (0.0198)
















gdp growtht-3 0.2238 (0.1526) 0.2126 (0.1679) 0.1934 (0.1667)
gdp growtht-4 -0.1477 (0.1772) -0.1791 (0.1922) -0.1938 (0.1896)













* 0.3322 (2381) 0.3020 (0.2374)
inflt-4 -0.1392 (0.1414) -0.1789 (0.1524) -0.1908 (0.1499)








mopot-2 -0.4565 (0.5876) -0.2940 (0.6403) -0.2866 (0.6309)
mopot-3 -0.4762 (0.3457) -0.3796 (0.3750) -0.3325 (0.3717)
mopot-4 -0.4498 (0.3429) -0.3553 (0.3583) -0.3386 (0.3605)











* 1.054 (1.370) 4.243 (3.009)
interactiont-2 0.0713 (0.0855) 0.9728 (1.395) 2.980 (2.645)
interactiont-3 -0.0391 (0.0676) -1.229 (1.130) 2.389 (2.533)
interactiont-4 0.0984 (0.0839) 2.968 (1.043)
*** -1.163 (2.857)











2(221) (p-value) 236.7 (0.223) 240.0 (0.181) 240.1 (0.425)




AR(2) N(0,1) (p-value) -0.4613 (0.645) -0.3814 (0.703) -0.3793 (0.704)
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APPENDIX C
Table C. Descriptive statistics on the Finnish banking sector 1995-2000
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Observations 347 346 343 340 337 333
Loans
Mean 143 153 139 656 142 384 160 149 173 236 195 983
Median 21 324 22 113 22 195 23 509 26 315 27 645
P25 11 994 12 257 12 683 13 080 14 788 15 937
P75 39 147 40 477 41 509 45 611 50 652 54 381
Max 23 550 647 22 313 706 22 195 902 24 949 840 26 228 131 28 755 218
Min 651 608 438 537 431 390
Std.Dev. 1 324 520 1 262 960 1 273 644 1 444 393 1 517 680 1 742 364
Deposits
Mean 149 237 145 503 152 235 156 222 165 937 172 668
Median 27 789 27 568 28 738 29 896 31 240 33 361
P25 16 154 16 081 17 378 18 153 18 550 19 632
P75 49 639 50 805 53 357 56 791 59 711 61 494
Max 22 609 479 21 314 093 22 325 488 22 909 110 23 413 413 25 054 403
Min 1 603 1 436 1 933 1 803 1 689 0
Std.Dev. 1 297 410 1 227 823 1 288 682 1 323 902 1 369 998 1 442 910
Total assets
Mean 289 571 285 769 306 031 307 705 338 240 380 274
Median 34 606 34 591 36 471 37 921 39 620 42 453
P25 20 869 21 624 22 327 22 524 23 694 25 236
P75 62 456 62 735 66 905 68 388 72 920 77 902
Max 45 715 954 44 571 638 49 195 440 50 582 984 52 471 370 61 141 488
Min 1 861 1 657 2 181 2 036 1 908 1 916
Std.Dev. 2 684 095 2 642 598 2 906 583 2 941 895 3 132 433 3 630 006
Liquid assets/total assets
Mean 0,111 0,132 0,132 0,123 0,104 0,087
Median 0,096 0,118 0,125 0,111 0,090 0,068
P25 0,055 0,056 0,054 0,046 0,035 0,030
P75 0,158 0,190 0,186 0,180 0,152 0,125
Max 0,418 0,504 0,803 0,458 0,421 0,683
Min 0,004 0,003 0,000 0,005 0,000 0,000
Std.Dev. 0,077 0,094 0,095 0,089 0,080 0,076
Capital/total assets
Mean 0,066 0,075 0,085 0,091 0,098 0,107
Median 0,062 0,072 0,081 0,087 0,094 0,103
P25 0,049 0,053 0,059 0,063 0,067 0,076
P75 0,080 0,095 0,110 0,114 0,120 0,127
Max 0,138 0,156 0,177 0,437 0,639 0,719
Min 0,026 0,029 0,003 0,021 0,028 0,030
Std.Dev. 0,021 0,027 0,032 0,038 0,048 0,055
Note:
Observations: the number of banks with loans reported;
End-of-the-year observations;
Loans, deposits and total assets in million euros.ECB • Working Paper No 100 • December 2001 46
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